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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-TITLE VII PROHIBITS FETAL
PROTECTION POLICY THAT EXCLUDES ALL FERTILE WOMEN FROM PO-
SITIONS INVOLVING LEAD EXPOSURE. International Union, United Auto
Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
Johnson Controls, Inc. manufactures batteries, the process of
which requires lead as a primary ingredient.' Lead exposure poses a
health hazard to those with whom it comes in contact, including un-
born children.' In 1982 Johnson Controls implemented a policy to ex-
clude all fertile women from positions involving lead exposure because
of the possible risk of injury to unborn children.' This change in policy
followed the pregnancies of eight women employees with blood lead
levels of over thirty micrograms per deciliter between 1979 and 1983.,
In 1984 a class action was certified challenging Johnson Controls'
fetal protection policy. 5 Petitioners in the suit included men and women
adversely affected by the policy who alleged that the policy constituted
1. International Union, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196,
1199 (1991).
2. Id. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) has established guide-
lines for employee lead exposure based upon the level of lead in the blood.' For workers planning to
become parents in the near future, the maximum level is set at 30 micrograms per 100 grams. No
distinction is made between male and female workers. 29 CFR § 1910.1025 (1990).
3. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. The policy stipulated that " '[I]t is [Johnson Con-
trols'] policy that women who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing children will not be
placed into jobs involving lead exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise
of job bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights.'" Id. (quoting App. at 85-86). Johnson
Controls' policy presumed all women to be fertile unless they could produce medical documenta-
tion of their infertility. Id.
4. 111 S. Ct. at 1199-1200. Of these eight reported pregnancies, no birth defects or other
abnormalities were reported. Id. at 1208. Prior to 1977 Johnson Controls employed only males in
battery manufacturing positions. In June of 1977 the company began hiring women for those
positions and warning them of the risks lead exposure posed to unborn children. Johnson Controls'
official policy announcing their decision to hire women for the first time included the following:
[P]rotection of the health of the unborn child is the immediate and direct responsibility
of the prospective parents. While the medical profession and the company can support
them in the exercise of this responsibility, it cannot assume it for them without simulta-
neously infringing their rights as persons .... Since not all women who can become
mothers wish to become mothers (or will become mothers), it would appear to be illegal
discrimination to treat all who are capable of pregnancy as though they will become
pregnant.
Id. at 1199 (quoting App. at 140).
5. Id.
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sex discrimination' as prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.7 The district court granted Johnson Controls' motion for sum-
mary judgment after concluding that the fetal protection policy was
defensible under a business necessity analysis.9 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision 9 after concluding that the business necessity defense was prop-
erly applied by the district court and Johnson Controls was entitled to
summary judgment. 10 The court of appeals further held that Johnson
Controls' fetal protection policy could also meet the more stringent
standard of being defensible as a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ)" as well as a business necessity.' 2 With this ruling, the Sev-
enth Circuit became the first circuit court to hold that an employer's
fetal protection policy applicable only to women could be justified as a
BFOQ. a
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari"' to address
the differences between the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
6. Id.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1988) [hereinafter Title VII].
8. 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988). Business necessity, a judicial creation, is an em-
ployer's defense to a Title VII disparate impact allegation. See infra notes 57-63 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of business necessity in the realm of fetal protection policies see Hayes v.
Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984), Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172
(4th Cir. 1982).
9. International Union, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th
Cir. 1989).
10. Id. at 901.
11. Id. at 893-901. The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to Title VII
violations is statutorily provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). See infra notes 40-47 and ac-
companying text.
12. 886 F.2d at 893-901.
13. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1202. Prior to the Seventh Circuit's ruling, the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits had confronted the issue of whether an employer's fetal protection policy
violates Title VII in Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) and Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984). The Court in Johnson Controls spoke of the
"obvious conflict" between the three circuits. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1202. However,
taken as a whole the cases were similiar in that each circuit court labelled sex specific fetal protec-
tion policies as facially neutral, thereby freeing the employer from the burden of establishing the
statutory BFOQ affirmative defense, and allowed the employer to use the more lenient business
necessity defense. Id. at 1203. The Seventh Circuit went one step further to say that a BFOQ
defense could be established to justify a sex specific fetal protection policy. Johnson Controls, 886
F.2d at 893. In contrast, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits assumed that an employer forced to
assert a BFOQ defense to a sex specific fetal protection policy would be unable to do so (or able to
do so only in the rarest of situations). Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549
n.9.
14. 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
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over the proper analysis of an employer's fetal protection policy. 15 The
Court reversed the lower court's decision. 16 The Court ruled that the
Seventh Circuit erred in applying the business necessity defense to a
disparate treatment case involving explicit facial discrimination.1 7 The
Court concluded that the sex specific fetal protection policy enacted by
Johnson Controls was sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII as
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.'8 International Union,
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.' 9 Congressional intent on the measure
is scant because the prohibition against sex-based discrimination was
added at the last minute in an attempt to prevent its passage. 0 In 1978
Congress amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA)." Passage of the PDA enlarged the definition of Title VII sex
discrimination to include pregnancy classifications. 2
15. 111 S. Ct. at 1202.
16. Id. at 1210.
17. Id. at 1203.
18. Id. at 1210.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reads in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
20. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964). Representative Smith of Virginia, a staunch opponent
of Title VII, proposed the addition of sex as a classification on the last day of the House debate.
Id. He was certain that the addition of sex to the antidiscrimination bill would bring its progres-
sion through Congress to an abrupt halt. See Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII
and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1977).
21. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)) [hereinafter PDA].
22. 42 US.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA reads:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similiar in their ability or inabil-
ity to work ....
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Congressional enactment of the PDA was a swift reaction to the
Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert," in which
the Court placed employment distinctions based on pregnancy outside
the reach of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. 4 Consequently, the
PDA, unlike the Title VII provision on sex discrimination, was accom-
panied by extensive legislative history.25 Despite the abundance of dis-
cussion regarding the PDA, however, Congress was virtually silent on
the potential fetal health issues posed by toxic work environments.26 As
a result, when the fetal protection policy issue surfaced judicially, the
courts struggled to fit these cases into one of the traditional Title VII
frameworks and accompanying defenses.
Under established Title VII law, two broad types of sexually dis-
criminatory practices are prohibited based upon the two statutory theo-
23. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
24. Id. at 133-34. In Gilbert, the Supreme Court upheld an employer's disability plan that
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage, while including other nonoccupational disa-
bilities. The Court reasoned that distinctions on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute sex
discrimination because women were included in both the pregnant and nonpregnant classifications.
Id. at 135.
The Court's decision in Gilbert provoked a spirited criticism among commentators. See, e.g.,
Hannah A. Furnish, Fetally Toxic Work Environments, 66 IOWA L. REV. 63, 75-77 (1980);
Sirota, supra note 20, at 1036-38.
25. See AMENDING TITLE VII, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-3 (1977); PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. REP. No.
948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (95 Stat.) 4749 [hereinafter HousE
REPORT]. Reports from both houses of Congress indicated that legislators considered the approach
taken in Gilbert to be contradictory to the nondiscrimination principles of Title VII. The House
Report noted:
the consequences of . . . discriminatory employment policies on pregnant women and
women in general has historically had a persistent and harmful effect upon their ca-
reers. Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women are marginal workers.
Until a woman passes the childbearing age, she is viewed by employers as potentially
pregnant. Therefore, the elimination of discrimination based on pregnancy in these em-
ployment practices . . . will go a long way toward providing equal employment oppor-
tunities for women, the goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
HOUSE REPORT at 4754-55.
26. See Furnish, supra note 24, at 78-82.
27. The traditional Title VII sex discrimination framework has been labelled by some as
inadequate to deal with fetal protection policies. Apparently, the alleged deficiencies stem not so
much from the Title VII analytical framework itself, but from various courts construing fetal
protection policies under Title VII, twisting and distorting the law rather than simply applying it.
See P. Elizabeth Hamlet, Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A Statutory Proposal in the Wake of
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1110, 1134-47 (1990)
(proposing legislation to deal with the fetal protection issue); Barbara J. Naretto, Note, Employ-
ment Discrimination Made Easy: Fetal Protection Policies, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 441, 469 (1990)




ries of "unlawful employment practices": 28 disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact. 9 Under each theory the plaintiff retains the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that a certain employment practice re-
sulted in discrimination forbidden by Title VII.3 °
Disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats certain em-
ployees less favorably than others based upon a distinction forbidden by
Title VII.3 1 Disparate treatment cases can be established in two ways,
either directly, by showing discrimination on its face (facial discrimina-
tion), or by showing that the employer's excuse for the practice is
pretextual (pretextual discrimination).8 2 Both categories require that
an intent to discriminate, either actual or implied, be shown.33
Direct or facial discrimination, the most straightforward type of
disparate treatment claim, arises when an employer enacts a practice
or policy that explicitly treats a group protected by Title VII differently
from others.3 4 The employer's categorization of employees on a basis
prohibited by Title VII establishes the requisite intent.3 5 For example,
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)-(2). See supra note 19 for the specific statutory language.
29. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Court distinguished between disparate treatment and
disparate impact in the following manner:
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most easily understood
type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discrimina-
tory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment. . . .Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished
from claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity ...
Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact
theory.
Id. at 335-36 n.15.
For a complete, intensive look at the disparate treatment versus disparate impact dichotomy,
see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1286-1394 (2d ed. 1983).
For an excellent discussion of Title VII analysis in general and in the specific context of fetal
protection policies see Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Recon-
ciliation of Fetal Protection With Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J.
641, 668-82 (1981).
30. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S 642 (1989).
31. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
32. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp. 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (1 1th Cir. 1984). See Williams,
supra note 29, at 673-82.
33. See Williams, supra note 29, at 669.
34. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547; See Williams, supra note 29, at 668.
35. See Williams, supra note 29, at 669 n.176.
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in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Co.,86 the Court found that an em-
ployer's hiring policy that refused to employ women with preschool age
children but imposed no similiar exclusion on men with preschool age
children was facially discriminatory.87 In Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power v. Manhart3 8 an employer's policy that required
women to make larger pension payments than men was found to be
facially discriminatory. 9 An employer charged with facial disparate
treatment discrimination has only one defense available, the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ)10 defense statutorily provided for in
Title VII.'1 This defense tolerates discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion, sex, or national origin only when such distinctions are "reasona-
bly necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise."' 2
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,"s the sole application by the United
States Supreme Court of the BFOQ to a sex discrimination case, the
Court specifically stated that the BFOQ defense is "meant to be an
extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of sex.""' Dothard involved an Alabama Board of Correc-
tions regulation that stated that only men would be hired for positions
involving contact with maximum security male prisoners.'" The Court
upheld the male-only hiring policy as a valid BFOQ.'6 The Court
stressed that an employer relying upon a BFOQ defense must prove
"that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for
believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to per-
form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."
'4 7
On the other hand, the more typical, and subtle, form of disparate
36. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
37. Id. at 544.
38. 435 U.S. 702 (1976).
39. Id. at 716.
40. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547; See Williams, supra note 29, at 668.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988).
42. Id. at § 2000e-2(e). The BFOQ defense is unavailable to an.employer charged with
discrimination on the basis of race. Id.
43. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
44. Id. at 334.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 333 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)). See also Williams, supra note 29, at 679-82 (discussing the BFOQ in the context of a
fetal protection case and concluding that the BFOQ defense is unavailable to an employer who
enacts a fetal protection plan and is charged with facial disparate treatment because the exclusion
of women is unrelated to their ability to perform their job).
222 [Vol. 14:217
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treatment-the pretextual variety-occurs when an employee alleges
that the employer intentionally treats him differently than others who
are similarly situated. In such cases, the law creates a presumption
based on a minimum threshold showing.' 8 Once the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case, an inference of discrimination arises analagous to a
rebuttable presumption." The employer can rebut the presumption by
alleging a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment
action taken.5 0 After the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reason for the challenged conduct, the employee must prove
that the grounds cited are merely a pretext for discriminatory intent.5 1
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion during the entire pretex-
ual disparate treatment analysis. 2
Disparate impact, the second major type of Title VII violation, oc-
curs when an employer adopts a neutral policy that has a dispropor-
tionate impact on a protected class.5 s The major distinction between
disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimination is found in the
differing points of emphasis of the two theories. Disparate impact fo-
cuses on the consequences of an employer's facially neutral policy, re-
gardless of intent.5 ' Conversely, disparate treatment focuses on the em-
48. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (finding that pretextual
racial discrimination may exist where an employer refuses to rehire a black employee because of
prior criminal conduct). McDonnell Douglas is the leading case for the pretextual disparate treat-
ment theory. The plaintiff in that case alleged racial discrimination, and he was able to make out
a prima facie case by showing: (1) that he was a member of a racial minority, (2) that he applied
for and was qualified for the job, (3) that he was rejected for the position despite his qualifica-
tions, and subsequently, (4) that the position remained unfilled and the employer continued to
take applications from persons with the plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802. See also Williams,
supra note 29, at 668-69 n.173 (discussing how pretext arguments arise in Title VII cases).
49. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
50. See generally Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (The
burden that shifts to the defendant is the burden of going forward with the case; the employer
need not prove legitimate, nondiscriminatory motivation; the plaintiff, not the defendant, retains
the burden of proof throughout the pretextual case.).
51. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The employee may meet her burden of proving
pretext by showing that the proffered reason is not worthy of credence or that it was not the true
reason for the conduct.
52. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56 (1981). Burdine applied the analysis set forth in McDon-
nell Douglas and expounded further on the allocations of proof. Id.
53. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In Griggs, black employees chal-
lenged an employer's use of intelligence tests as unrelated to job performance and as having a
disproportionate exclusionary effect on blacks. The Court responded by creating the disparate
impact theory, stating that Title VII forbids employment practices that are "fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation" as well as overt discrimination. Id.
54. See id. at 430-32. Intent to discriminate is irrelevant under the discriminatory impact
theory because intent is inferred from the employer's adoption of the policy in spite of its apparent
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ployer's intent to discriminate, either actual or implied."
The disparate impact theory of recovery had its judicial birth in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co." A plaintiff seeking to prove disparate im-
pact must establish a prima facie case by showing, usually through sta-
tistical evidence, that an employer's neutral policy substantially and ad-
versely impacts a group protected by Title VII.5
7
At the same time the Court created the disparate impact theory, it
formulated the business necessity defense which allowed employers to
defend against allegations of disparate impact employment discrimina-
tion.58 Under the Court's reasoning in Griggs, an employer confronted
with a prima facie case of disparate impact had a burden to assert a
business necessity defense to avoid liability. 9 If the defendant re-
sponded with a valid business necessity defense, the plaintiff was then
given an opportunity to prove that a less discriminatory alternative ex-
isted to accomplish the same result.60
effects. Id.
55. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Discriminatory motive must be proven to hold an
employer liable for discriminatory treatment. Id. See Williams, supra note 29, at 669-70; Furnish,
supra note 24, at 88-89.
56. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that an employment practice that results in the exclusion
of blacks and is not related to job performance is prohibited). In Griggs, the Court first inter-
preted Title VII to prohibit neutral policies with discriminatory effects. The Court stated:
The objective of Congress ... was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
57. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
These leading cases established the order and allocation of proof in disparate impact cases. Id. See
also Williams, supra note 29, at 671-72 (discussing the creation by the courts of disparate impact
and its importance in attaining equal employment goals espoused by Title VII).
58. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The Court stated that:
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to ex-
clude [a protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited .... Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.
Id. at 431-32. See also Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 1983)
(citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431). But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658-
59 (1989) (requiring that "the legitimate employment goals of the employer" be furthered by the
challenged employment practice).
59. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. In Griggs the Court stated that "Congress has placed on the
employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to
the employment in question." Id. See also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
60. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425 (1975).
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In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,6 1 the Court revamped the
traditional burdens of proof in a disparate impact case so that the
plaintiff now retains the burden of persuasion at all times.62 Addition-
ally, the language in Wards Cove widened the business necessity de-
fense considerably by describing the crux of a business necessity de-
fense as "whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer." 63 After Wards Cove,
plaintiffs who are able to prove that an employment policy has a dis-
criminatory effect on a protected population face the additional burden
of showing that the employer's underlying objective can be met by an
alternative that has a less discriminatory impact upon the plaintiff's
group while simultaneously not burdening the defendant employer with
additional costs.
4
Thus, a court's designation of a challenged employment practice as
facially discriminatory or facially neutral establishes both the plaintiff's
burden of proof and the defense-either the more stringent BFOQ or
the less demanding business necessity defense-that will be available to
the defendant. 65 This distinction is likely to be outcome determinative,
particularly when the challenged employment practice is a fetal protec-
tion policy. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Con-
trols,66 cases involving fetal protection policies were disposed of as dis-
parate impact cases." In Wright v. Olin Corp.,68 the court decided to
61. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
62. Id. at 659.
63. Id. at 658-59. See Marcelo L. Riffaud, Comment, Fetal Protection and UAW v. John-
son Controls, Inc.: Job Openings For Barren Women Only, 58 FORDHAM L. REVIEw 843, 853-54
(1990).
The Wards Cove decision has evoked considerable criticism among commentators. See gener-
ally, Raymond L. Hogler, and Jeanette N. Cleveland, Wards Cove and the Theory of Disparate
Impact: From Bad Law to Worse Policy, 41 LAB. L.J. 138, 142 (1990).
64. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660. Because a plaintiff is likely to have both limited funds
and limited access to employer motivations, this task may prove to be inordinately difficult and
ultimately may be outcome determinative. See Hamlet, Note, supra note 27, at 1117.
65. At least one commentator has criticized some jurisdictions for blurring the distinction
and demonstrating confusion about these important differences. See Williams, supra note 29, at
670 n.179 (discussing lower federal court decisions indicating that the BFOQ defense and business
necessity defense, instead of being separate and distinct, might be commingled and used to defend
either type of employment discrimination).
66. International Union, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991).
67. See. e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th
Cir. 1982). Each of these cases determined that the disparate impact/business necessity analysis
was the proper framework to evaluate policies that excluded women from certain employment
1991]
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analyze Olin's fertility policy as facially neutral, although the court ad-
mitted that the label "might be subject to logical dispute." 69 The court
determined that to apply the facial discrimination/BFOQ analysis
would unfairly prejudice the employer since a BFOQ defense could not
be established.70 The court proceeded to advance a three-pronged in-
quiry to satisfy the business necessity defense in the context of a fetal
protection policy.
71
In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital,72 a subsequent fetal pro-
tection case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals "borrowed" the
Wright criteria and applied them to the facts of its case.7" The court in
Hayes stated that under its analysis, a sex specific fetal protection pol-
icy violates Title VII unless a defendant can show: "(1) that a substan-
tial risk of harm exists, and (2) the risk is borne only by members of
one sex, and (3) the employee fails to show that there are acceptable
alternative policies that would have a lesser impact on the affected
sex."
74
positions based on a stated concern for fetal health.
The decision by these courts to evaluate fetal protection policies under this framework has
been criticized by commentators. See Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnera-
bility Policies, 53 U. CH. L. RaV 1219, 1248-51 (1986); Barbara J. Naretto, Note, Employment
Discrimination Made Easy: Fetal Protection Policies, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 441, 457-60 (1990);
Diane S. Peake, Note, Employment Discrimination-Wright v. Olin Corp.: Title VII and the
Exclusion of Women from the Fetally Toxic Workplace, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1068, 1083 (1984). It
should be noted that during the period between the Court's grant of certiorari and its decision in
Johnson Controls, the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment for an
employer who excluded all fertile female employees from foundry jobs involving lead exposure.
Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990). In making its determination that
the employer could justify the fetal protection policy only as a BFOQ, the court stated, "[w]e
agree with the view of the dissenters in Johnson Controls that fetal protection policies perforce
amount to overt sex discrimination, which cannot logically be recast as disparate impact and can-
not be countenanced without proof that infertility is a BFOQ." Id. at 1310.
68. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). Wright was the first federal court of appeals case to
address the fetal protection plan dilemma. Id.
69. Id. at 1186. Olin's policy barred all fertile women from work areas involving exposure to
hazardous chemicals, primarily lead. Id. at 1182.
70. Id. at 1185 n.21. The court's only stated justification for analyzing the policy under a
disparate impact analysis rather than a disparate treatment analysis is to allow the employer a
defense. Id.
71. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190.
72. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 1548 n.8. Hayes involved a hospital that dismissed an x-ray technician after she
became pregnant to avoid potential liability for fetal harm due to radiation exposure. Id. at 1546.
74. Id. at 1554. The Hayes court stressed that it was not applying a business necessity
defense even though the showing required of the employer was identical. Id. at 1548 n.8. Instead
of classifying the policy as neutral on the front-end, the court began its analysis by saying that the
policy presented a presumption of facial discrimination, rebuttable by the employer's satisfaction
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In International Union, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Con-
trols, 7  both the district court76 and the Seventh Circuit" followed the
analytical framework used by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits in
Wright and Hayes.78 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the notion
that sex specific fetal protection policies can be classified as anything
but facially discriminatory. 9 In support, the Court pointed out that
Johnson Controls completely ignored evidence that lead exposure is
equally as detrimental to the male reproductive system as it is to a
female's in making the decision to implement a restrictive policy per-
taining only to women.80 Additionally, the Court declared that the
PDA mandates that a fetal protection policy that excludes all women
from employment on the basis of their childbearing capability must be
labelled facially discriminatory.81 As such, the Court held that Johnson
Controls' only defense was to establish a BFOQ.82
Reaffirming previous holdings that the BFOQ defense is to be
given a narrow, restrictive interpretation, the Supreme Court next con-
of the first and second prongs of the "defense." Id. at 1548-49.
The court offered no precedent to explain why it could simply ignore the BFOQ, a statutory
affirmative defense, in an aditittedly facially discriminatory situation and replace it with other
requirements. See Naretto, Note, supra note 67, at 463 n.161.
75. 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988), affd en banc, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
Ill S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
76. Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
77. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
78. Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 315; 886 F.2d at 883-87.
79. Johnson Controls, III S. Ct. at 1202-03. The Court stated:
The bias in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile women,
are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a partic-
ular job .... [Johnson Controls'] fetal-protection policy explicitly discriminates against
women on the basis of their sex. The policy excludes women with childbearing capacity
from lead-exposed jobs and so creates a facial classification based on gender.
Id. at 1202.
80. Id. The Court noted further that under a Hayes analysis, Johnson Controls would not
have prevailed because their policy protected only the children of female employees. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1204. The entire Court agreed that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy was
defensible only as a BFOQ. The majority declared that "[t]he beneficence of an employer's pur-
pose does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination
... and thus may be defended only as a BFOQ." Id. Justice White agreed in a concurring
opinion that "[tihe Court properly holds that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy overtly
discriminates against women, and thus is prohibited by Title VII unless it falls within the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception .. " Id. at 1210 (White, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Scalia stated in his concurrence that he generally agreed with the majority's analysis except
for several reservations, none of which contradicted the conclusion that the only defense available
to Johnson Controls was the BFOQ. Id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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sidered whether Johnson Controls could establish a BFOQ.88 The
Court rejected Johnson Controls' argument that the "so-called safety
exception to the BFOQ" applied.8' In the context of a sex specific fetal
protection policy, the safety exception, the Court held, is limited to in-
stances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with an em-
ployee's ability to perform her job.8" The Court distinguished its deci-
sions in Dothard v. Rawlinson8 and Western Airlines, Inc. v.
Criswell8" by noting that the third parties in those cases were essential
to the specific business in question.88 The Court succinctly summarized
its view when it stated: "No one can disregard the possibility of injury
to future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it trans-
forms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of
batterymaking."89
The Court's examination of the PDA and its legislative history re-
sulted in the conclusion that the PDA contains its own BFOQ.10 Ac-
cording to the majority opinion, pregnant or fertile women in an em-
ployment setting must be treated the same as other workers not so
affected, as long as their abilities to perform the job in question do not
differ.9 1 The Court then concluded that, based on the record, Johnson
Controls could not present a valid BFOQ. 92
Justice White, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, wrote that the majority erroneously
interpreted the BFOQ defense so narrowly that a sex specific fetal pro-
tection policy could never be justified.9" The concurring justices as-
83. Id. at 1204-07.
84. Id. at 1205.
85. Id.
86. 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (sex was found to be a valid BFOQ in an all-male maximum
security prison).
87. 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (age-based discrimination against flight engineer justified based on
the safety of airplane passengers).
88. Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. at 1205-06.
89. Id. at 1206
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1206-07. One of the two concurring opinions disagreed with the idea that the
PDA altered the BFOQ defense. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, wrote that the PDA's only purpose was to bring pregnancy discrimination within the
realm of the protection of Title VII. Id. at 1213-14 (White, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1207. In order for Johnson Controls' to establish a valid BFOQ under the major-
ity opinion, the employer would have to demonstrate that substantially all fertile female employees
were unable to perform their jobs. Id. at 1208.
93. Id. at 1210 (White, J., concurring). The concurrence also disagreed with the majority
that Johnson Controls' policy had to be completely invalidated. Id. at 1215-16.
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serted that an employer could justify a fetal protection policy as a
BFOQ by showing that the exclusion of women was either reasonably
necessary to avoid substantial tort liability " or reasonably necessary
for the safe operation of the business.9" Further, they also indicated
that increased costs other than tort liability might be sufficient to jus-
tify a fetal protection policy as a BFOQ.96
Although the majority held that sex specific fetal protection poli-
cies violate Title VII, other questions were left unanswered. For exam-
ple, will an employer who complies with Title VII face tort liability if
an employee's fetus sustains injuries as a result of exposure to toxics in
the workplace?97 The concurring justices were particularly concerned
with the potential for employer tort liability, an issue they alleged the
majority dismissed by speculation.9" The majority labelled the possibil-
ity of an employer being held liable under general tort principles "re-
mote at best"99 since Title VII forbids sex specific fetal protection poli-
cies. If the employer warns women fully of the risks of exposure and
does not act negligently, there should be no liability.100 In contrast, the
concurring justices disagreed that the tort issue was that easily resolved
and made three observations to illustrate that viewpoint. First, the con-
currence pointed out that the issue of whether Title VII compliance
94. Id. at 1210.
95. Id. at 1212-13. With respect to the interpretation to be given to the safety exception of
the BFOQ defense, the concurrence disagreed with the majority's attempt to distinguish Dothard,
433 U.S. 321, and Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, as situations in which the third parties whose safety
was being considered were essential to the specific business in question. Id. See supra notes 83-88
and accompanying text for the majority's rejection of the safety exception to the BFOQ. The
concurrence stated that, "protecting fetal safety while carrying out the duties of battery manufac-
turing is as much a legitimate concern as is safety to third parties in guarding prisons (Dothard)
or flying airplanes (Criswell)." Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1213 (White, J., concurring).
96. 111 S. Ct. at 1213 (White, J., concurring). On this point, the concurrence stated that
the enactment of the BFOQ indicated an unwillingness on the part of Congress "'to require em-
ployers to change the very nature of their operations.'" Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989)).
Justice Scalia, in a separate concurrence, also asserted that the majority went too far in
stating that increased costs, short of business threatening costs, cannot support a BFOQ defense.
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. This is not a purely hypothetical question. There is already one reported case in which
a female employee's child sued a battery manufacturer for injuries caused by lead exposure. The
case made it to the jury, but the verdict was returned for the employer. Security Nat'l Bank v.
Chloride, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 294 (D. Kan. 1985).
98. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1211 (White, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 1208.
100. Id. While the majority stressed its prior decisions which held that an employer cannot
rely on the incremental costs of hiring women to justify discrimination under Title VII, it stopped
short of saying that business threatening costs could never excuse Title VII violations. Id. at 1209.
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will preempt state tort claims remains unsettled. 10 1 Second, warnings of
potential fetal injuries to parents will not prevent the assertion of tort
claims by injured children because parents cannot waive their off-
spring's causes of action and any negligence on the parents behalf will
not be imputed to their children. 10 Third, employers will be faced with
the difficult task of determining in advance what constitutes negli-
gence.103 Thus, employers with fetally toxic work environments are left
to speculate on whether they may face future tort liability for comply-
ing with Title VII.
The Johnson Controls decision makes it practically impossible for
an employer to enact a fetal protection policy without violating Title
VII, as amended by the PDA. This decision makes further inroads for
women in the workplace. It certainly comports with Congressional ef-
forts to protect women from being penalized in the workforce as a re-
sult of their sex. Restrictions on the employment opportunities of
women are neither new nor rare 01 -neither are fetal protection poli-
cies.105  Interestingly, employers have excluded all fertile women
through the enactment of fetal protection policies only in male domi-
101. Id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring). By the majority's own admission, the issue of
whether an employer's compliance with Title VII will preempt state tort liability if an employee's
child suffers an injury due to fetal exposure in a toxic workplace remains unanswered. While
acknowledging that the preemption issue was not before the Court, the majority reflected that an
employer complying with Title VII would not be held liable for violating state law if it was impos-
sible to comply with both state and federal laws. The majority further speculated that state tort
liability might obstruct the Congressional aim in enacting Title VII, which was to prevent discrim-
ination in the workplace. Id. at 1209.
102. Id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring).
103. Id.
104. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Supreme Court in Muller employed
the following rhetoric to justify an Oregon statute limiting working women to ten-hour work days:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her
at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when
the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not . . . continuance for a
long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects
upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race.
Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon
man .. ..
Id. at 421.
105. Companies such as American Cyanamid, Allied Chemical, B.F. Goodrich, Monsanto,
Sun Oil, Gulf Oil, Union Carbide, and General Motors, to name a few, are among those who have
enacted restrictive fetal protection policies. See Becker, supra note 67, at 1226. By one estimate,
fetal protection programs place upwards of 100,000 jobs out of women's reach. Williams, supra
note 29, at 647.
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nated occupations. 10 Despite the evidence of fetal health risks in other,
traditionally female jobs, employers generally allow women to continue
working in these positions without imposing fetal safety limitations. 107
This dichotomy between "male" and "female" occupations has been
attributed to various employer concerns, 108 all of which translate into
various financial reasons for excluding women, via sex specific fetal
protection policies, from the typically male blue-collar work force. 109
Furthermore, the evidence traditionally relied on to establish risks
to fetal health is questionable as well as slanted almost exclusively to-
wards examining only those hazards introduced maternally. Paternally
transmitted fetal risks are virtually ignored by both the scientific com-
munity in their experimental efforts and employers who are (or should
be) aware of such risks.110 All of which casts at least a shadow of doubt
on employer assertions that the enactment of fetal protection policies
are truly and exclusively acts of beneficence for fetal well-being.'
Irrespective of their actual motivation, employers seeking to pro-
tect fetal health must now do it through neutral rather than gender-
specific policies to avoid Title VII liability."' Unfortunately, with the
question of whether compliance with Title VII will preempt tort liabil-
ity remaining unanswered, employers may be left in a quandary. If em-
ployers who nonnegligently keep the doors open to both sexes are sub-
jected to tort liability, both men and women stand to lose if those jobs
disappear.
Thus, the costs and stakes associated'with the two big questions
left unanswered by Johnson Controls-whether there can be a cost-
based BFOQ in any circumstance and whether compliance with Title
106. Becker, supra note 67, at 1237-40. Such policies have been implemented almost exclu-
sively in unionized, traditionally male, blue-collar industries. Id. at 1240.
107. Becker, supra note 67, at 1238-39.
108. Some of these considerations include: the extra cost of providing facilities (washrooms
and showers), equipment, and clothing for women; dealing with the disruptions and disorder likely
to result from admitting women into the traditionally male workplace where men are often hostile
to female co-workers; and, in unionized industries with fixed pay systems, an inability to offset the
high costs of hiring women by paying them lower wages. Becker, supra note 67, at 1240-41.
109. Becker, supra note 67, at 1237-40. This is not to imply that financial considerations are
anything but relevant to an employer who must make a profit or cease to exist.
110. Becker, supra note 67, at 1236.
111. Johnson Controls sought to justify its fetal protection policy solely on its avowed con-
cern for fetal health.
112. At least one commentator contends that, in the long run, this result may prove more
beneficial for fetal health because it demands that employers address fetal toxins transmitted from
both the male and female. Williams, supra note 29, at 681-82. Of course, the flip side of this coin
is that employers might decide simply to ignore fetal health interests altogether.
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VII may result in tort liability for fetal injuries-pose a number of




After this note was accepted for publication, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. The new Act makes extensive changes in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other anti-discrimination
statutes. The topic of this Note, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct.
1196 (1991), is substantively unaffected by the new Act. However, the
Act did explicitly overrule several recent Supreme Court decisions, in-
cluding Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), dis-
cussed in this note. Practicing attorneys should consult the new Act
for specific changes.
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